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DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
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Abstract—This paper compares economic outcomes across areas in India
that were under direct British colonial rule with areas that were under
indirect colonial rule. Controlling for selective annexation using a specific
policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly
lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial
period. I find evidence that the quality of governance in the colonial period
has a significant and persistent effect on postcolonial outcomes.
I. Introduction
WHETHER the experience of colonial rule has had along-term impact on economic development is a
topic that has generated considerable debate. Several schol-
ars have emphasized the negative effects of colonial rule on
development, citing factors such as excessive exploitation
of colonies, drain of resources, or the growth of a depen-
dency complex (see Frank, 1978, or Bagchi, 1982). Others
emphasize the positive role of colonial empires in securing
peace and external defense (Lal, 2004) and encouraging
international trade and capital movements (Ferguson, 2002).
Some authors also hold the view that resource endowments
or area characteristics are the major determining forces of
long-term outcomes and that colonial rule plays only a minor
part (e.g., Herbst, 2000, on Africa, or Roy, 2002, on India).
I examine the colonial experience of one country, India,
and compare the long-term outcomes of areas that were
under direct British colonial rule with those that were under
indirect colonial rule. Indirect rule in this context refers to
those areas of India that were under the administration of
Indian kings rather than the British Crown; these were
known as the native states or the princely states. The
defense and foreign policies of these native states were
completely controlled by the British during the colonial
period, but they enjoyed considerable autonomy in matters
of internal administration. After the end of colonial rule in
1947, all of these areas were integrated into independent
India and have since been subject to a uniform administra-
tive, legal, and political structure. The analysis in this paper
therefore cannot answer the question of what outcomes
would have been like in the complete absence of colonial
rule, but it does illustrate the persistent effects of different
degrees of colonial rule.
The major issue in such a comparison is, of course, the
problem of selection. It is unlikely that the British randomly
annexed areas for direct colonial rule. I am able to solve the
selection problem by taking advantage of a unique feature
of British annexation policy in India. Between 1848 and
1856, the British governor-general, Lord Dalhousie, imple-
mented the notorious Doctrine of Lapse, under which he
refused to recognize adopted heirs and annexed several
native states where the ruler died without a natural heir. This
policy enables me to use the death of a ruler without an heir
in the specific period of 1848 to 1856 as an instrument for
becoming part of the British Empire, and thus coming under
direct colonial rule. The identifying assumption here is that
the death of a ruler without an heir, in this specific period of
time, is likely to be a matter of circumstance and unlikely to
have a direct impact on outcomes in the postcolonial period.
I find that the directly ruled British areas have signifi-
cantly lower availability of public goods such as schools,
health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period and are
not significantly better off in terms of agricultural invest-
ments and productivity. These instrumental variable esti-
mates, which control for selective annexation, contrast
sharply with OLS results that show directly ruled British
areas having significantly higher agricultural investments
and productivity. This suggests strongly that the British
annexed areas with the greatest agricultural potential, but
did not invest as much as native states did in physical and
human capital. This underinvestment is costly for develop-
ment: directly ruled areas have higher levels of poverty and
infant mortality in the postcolonial period.
I perform several robustness checks for my instrumental
variable strategy to verify that the fact of a ruler dying
without a natural heir does not have an independent effect
on long-term outcomes. In particular, I conduct a falsifica-
tion exercise and consider deaths of rulers without natural
heirs in a different period when the Doctrine of Lapse had
been officially abandoned by the British (so that death
Received for publication December 6, 2007. Revision accepted for
publication May 1, 2009.
* Harvard Business School.
I thank two anonymous referees, Josh Angrist, Simon Johnson, Kaivan
Munshi, Nathan Nunn, Rohini Pande, Marko Tervio¨, and numerous
seminar participants for extremely helpful comments. I am grateful to
Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, and Esther Duflo for valuable advice
and guidance throughout this project, the MIT Department of Economics
and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support, Esther Duflo for
generously sharing her code for the randomization inference procedure,
and Latika Chaudhury for data from the 1911 census.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, November 2010, 92(4): 693–713
© 2010 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
would not result in becoming part of the British Empire). I
find no significant differences here, supporting the conclu-
sion that it is the fact of direct colonial rule that matters for the
long run rather than other aspects of historical ruler deaths.
I consider several different explanations of why we might
see greater investment in human and physical capital in the
indirectly ruled areas. I find that the gap between direct and
indirect rule areas on these measures is narrowing over time,
suggesting that differences in postcolonial institutions are un-
likely to be the intervening mechanism. The differences in
human capital outcomes, such as literacy, were present in the
colonial period itself. I examine the operation of one specific
institution, electoral democracy, and find no differences in
electoral participation or the competitiveness of elections be-
tween direct and indirect rule areas in the postcolonial period.
I then examine differences in colonial period institutions
and find three suggestive facts. First, native states raised
higher taxes per capita than directly ruled British areas did,
but this does not explain the differences in access to public
goods. However, it does rule out the possibility that exces-
sive colonial extraction is the driving mechanism. Second,
local institutions, such as the prevalent land tenure system,
matter for long-term outcomes only in the British areas and
not in indirectly ruled areas. Third, the fact that the British
retained the right to depose the native state rulers in cases of
“misrule” appears to play an important role. This right was
exercised quite often and thus constituted a credible threat.
I find that areas where the British deposed the rulers were
indeed the worst-performing ones in the sense that these
areas do not show any significant advantage compared to
the directly ruled British areas. Overall, this pattern of
results suggests that good governance in the colonial period
has persistent effects, and that directly ruled areas were on
par with the least-well-governed native states.
This paper is part of a growing research program dem-
onstrating the long-term impacts of colonial rule. The ques-
tion of what outcomes would have been had European coun-
tries never established vast overseas empires is quite difficult to
answer because of the potential for spillover effects from
colonies to noncolonies. Most comparative research has there-
fore focused on the effects of different types, or “flavors,” of
colonial rule. Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) find that islands
with longer periods of colonial rule have better present-day
outcomes; Bertocchi and Canova (2002) find that the postin-
dependence economic performance of British colonies in Af-
rica is less volatile than that of French and German colonies.
Several papers have examined the long-term conse-
quences of specific institutions developed by colonial pow-
ers. These include the property rights institutions created by
colonial rulers (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001), the
distribution of historical property rights (Engerman &
Sokoloff, 2005; Banerjee & Iyer, 2005), the legal systems
put in place by colonial powers (La Porta et al., 1998a,
1998b; Berkowitz & Clay, 2004), the systems of tax collec-
tion (Berger, 2008), the extent of slavery (Nunn, 2008), and
colonial investments in education and health (Huillery,
2006). Some of these studies use innovative instrumental
variables to get around the problem of selection. Acemoglu
et al. (2001) use initial settler mortality as an instrument for
the strength of property rights institutions, Feyrer and Sac-
erdote (2009) use wind patterns as an exogenous determi-
nant of colonial rule, and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) rely on
exogenous changes in British land policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the British colonial experience in India and the
nature of indirect colonial rule in the native states. Section
III discusses why indirect rule might have different long-
term consequences than direct colonial rule. Section IV
briefly discusses the OLS comparisons between areas under
direct and indirect rule, and section V describes the instru-
mental variables strategy and provides estimates of the
causal impact of British rule. Section VI documents differ-
ences between areas under direct and indirect rule over time,
section VII provides empirical evidence on several possible
intervening mechanisms, and section VIII concludes the paper.
II. Direct and Indirect British Colonial Rule in India
A. British India and the Native States
The British Empire in the Indian subcontinent lasted
nearly 200 years. Beginning in 1757, all the areas of
present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma were
brought under British political control by the middle of the
nineteenth century. Of this area, “British India” was defined
as “all territories and places within Her Majesty’s domin-
ions which are for the time being governed by Her Majesty
through the Governor-General of India.”1 The remaining areas
were referred to as the “native states” or the “princely states”
by the colonial government and were ruled by hereditary
kings.2 I will use the term native states throughout the paper.
About 680 native states were recognized by the Foreign
Office in 1910. Native states constituted about 45% of the
total area of British India (excluding Burma and Sind) and
about 23% of the total population in 1911. The map in figure
1 shows the geographical distribution of native states. We
see that native states were present in all parts of India, with
somewhat higher concentrations in the western and central
parts of the country.
1 Interpretation Act of 1889.
2 The precise definition of a native state was a matter of some debate. Sir
William Lee-Warner (1910), for instance, defined a native state as “a
political community, occupying a territory in India of defined boundaries,
and subject to a common and responsible ruler who has actually enjoyed
and exercised, as belonging to him in his own right duly recognized by the
supreme authority of the British Government, any of the functions and
attributes of internal sovereignty.” According to the Imperial Gazetteer
(Hunter et al., 1908), a major defining feature can be said to be “the
personal rule of the chief and his control over legislation and the admin-
istration of justice.” In practice, this meant that “whether or not a so-called
Native State is what it professes to be is a question of fact which, in the
absence of a legal decision, must be settled by the present action of the
British paramount power,” that is, native states were those that had been
recognized by the British as such.
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Native states varied considerably in all dimensions. Some
consisted of only a few villages, while the largest native
state, Hyderabad, had an area of 98,000 square miles. They
had varying degrees of legal autonomy, from “first-class
states,” which had maximum legal powers (including that of
the death penalty over their own subjects, though not over
British subjects), to “third-class states,” which could only
try civil cases involving small sums of money. Native states
also varied considerably with regard to their systems of
administration and revenue collection, their currency, legal
codes, law enforcement, and justice systems. Over time,
some states adopted the legal codes and currency prevailing
in British India. The British usually did not force them to do
so but waited instead for “the willing cooperation of the
Native princes.” The majority of rulers were Hindu kings,
though there were several Muslim and Sikh rulers as well.3
B. British Policy toward the Native States
The British did not bring the whole Indian subcontinent
under direct colonial rule mainly because of a major policy
change in the nineteenth century. After the Sepoy mutiny of
1857, the British stopped all further annexation of native
states into the British Empire. British policy toward the
native states underwent considerable changes over time,
from the policy of the ring fence (1765–1818), to that of
subordinate isolation (1818–1858), to that of nonannexation
with the right of intervention (1858–1947).
The Ring Fence. In initial period of British rule (1765–
1818), the East India Company did not wish to annex too
much territory under its own administration, because it was
numerically and politically weak and because it wanted to
maintain a “ring fence” between its areas and the stronger
empires of the Marathas and the Sikhs. Despite this policy
of nonintervention, the East India Company annexed a
number of areas during this period, mostly by fighting
and winning wars against Indian rulers (table 1). Several
3 Appendix A lists details of the major native states in our data set. In
1877, the largest and most important states were designated by the British
as “salute states,” meaning that the rulers were entitled to a ceremonial
gun salute. The table lists the native states in order of the number of guns
in the salute, reflecting their importance in the eyes of the British.
FIGURE 1.—BRITISH INDIA AND NATIVE STATES
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territories were also ceded or granted to the British by native
rulers, usually for nonpayment of debts or tribute.
Subordinate Isolation. In 1817–1818, after winning a
series of battles in central India, the British emerged as the
dominant political power in the subcontinent. The East India
Company now followed the policy of subordinate isolation:
all native states were made politically subordinate to the
British and accepted the British as the “paramount power”
in India. They could not declare war, establish relations with
other states, or employ Europeans without explicit British
permission. Many of them signed treaties with the British
that regulated the size of their armed forces, and several
native states had British forces stationed within their terri-
tory. Most of the native states also had annual tribute
obligations to the British government (or in some cases to
another native state): for the native states in our data set, the
tribute varied from 0 to 28% of state revenue. However,
they were allowed considerable autonomy in internal mat-
ters unless they had specific treaty provisions.4
Between 1818 and 1848, the East India Company con-
tinued annexing territory by various means. The pace of
British annexation picked up considerably after Lord Dal-
housie became governor-general in 1848. In addition to
fighting the second Sikh war in Punjab, Lord Dalhousie also
annexed areas by taking over territories due to nonpayment
of debts (Berar), accusing the native rulers of “misrule”
(Oudh), and, most controversial, refusing to recognize adop-
tions and annexing areas where the native ruler died without
a natural heir (the so-called policy of lapse).
End of Annexation. In 1857, Indian soldiers in the
British army mutinied against their officers. The causes of
this Sepoy mutiny are not very clear, and historians disagree
as to whether it was a planned war of independence against
British power or an uncoordinated uprising of soldiers who
felt a threat to their religion and traditional practices (Spear,
2002), or simply a mutiny by soldiers who wanted increased
pay and greater career opportunities (David, 2002). After
some initial reverses, the British rallied and were able to
suppress the mutiny by the end of 1858.
After this major shock to British power, the administra-
tion of India was taken over by the British Crown from the
East India Company in 1858. Many native states had aided
the British during the mutiny by supplying troops and
equipment or by defending the Europeans within their territory.
As a recognition of this, plans of further annexation were given
up, with the queen’s proclamation of 1858 stating specifically,
“We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions.”
Thus, the areas that had not been annexed until 1858 continued
to be native states until the end of British rule in 1947.
Although the British gave up outright annexation of
territory, they reserved the right to intervene in the internal
affairs of native states “to set right such serious abuses in a
Native Government as may threaten any part of the country
with anarchy or disturbance.”5 They exercised this right in
several native states, often by deposing the ruler and install-
ing another in his place (usually a son, brother, cousin, or
adopted heir) or by appointing a British administrator or
council of regency for some time before allowing the king
to take up ruling powers again.6
C. Native States in Independent India
When the British left India in 1947, all native states
signed treaties of accession to the newly independent na-
tions of India or Pakistan, sometimes under the threat of
military action. By 1950, all of the native states within the
borders of India had been integrated into independent India
and were subject to the same administrative, legal, and
political systems as those of the erstwhile British Indian
areas. The rulers of these states were no longer sovereign
rulers, but many of them continued to play an active role in
the politics of postindependence India. They were granted
annual incomes, referred to as privy purses, by the Indian
government as partial compensation for their loss of state
revenue, but this privilege, along with all other princely
honors, was discontinued in 1971.
III. Why Might Direct Colonial Rule Matter for
Long-Term Outcomes?
Why should areas directly ruled by a colonial power have
different long-run outcomes compared to areas ruled indi-
rectly by local rulers? I consider two broad types of mech-
anisms. The first is that differences in historical circum-
4 These could be explicit restrictions, such as the ruler of Panna being
asked to abolish the practice of sati (widow burning) in his kingdom, or
more general ones, such as the ruler of Oudh being required to implement
policies that “shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be
calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants.”
5 Lord Canning, Government of India Foreign Department Despatch No.
43A to S/S, April 30, 1860.
6 Different viceroys used this power to intervene in different degrees.
One of the most vigorous in this regard was Lord Curzon, viceroy from
1899 to 1905, during whose tenure fifteen rulers were either forced to
abdicate or temporarily deprived of their powers (Ashton, 1982).
TABLE 1.—GROWTH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA
Period
Number of Districts Annexed and Reason
TotalConquest Ceded or Granted Misrule Lapse
1757–1790 60 19 0 0 79
1791–1805 46 37 1 0 84
1806–1818 29 0 0 0 29
1819–1835 20 0 1 0 21
1836–1847 19 0 1 1 21
1848–1856 2 4 12 16 34
1857–1947 0 1 0 0 1
Total 176 61 15 17 269
Note: Number of districts refers to 1991 districts. The total number of districts is 415, of which 269
were classified as belonging to British India. The states of Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim, and Tripura are excluded from the study. The number of districts in subsequent regressions will
be below 415 due to missing data and because some districts were split into two or more new districts
over time; also some data sets use older unsplit districts. The one district added after 1858 is
Panchmahals, which was ceded by the ruler of Gwalior to the British in exchange for some other territory.
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stances might affect postcolonial policies or the functioning
of modern institutions and therefore lead to differences in
postcolonial outcomes. This has been shown in other stud-
ies, such as the greater propensity of historically unequal
Indian states to enact land reforms (Banerjee & Iyer, 2005)
or the functioning of the legal system across different U.S.
states (Berkowitz & Clay, 2004).
In terms of direct and indirect rule, one potential institu-
tional difference is likely to be in the operation of demo-
cratic processes. Members of the erstwhile ruling families of
the native states continued to be active in the politics of
postcolonial India, with several former princes being elected
to national and state-level political office (Allen & Dwivedi,
1998). Such candidates have significant electoral advan-
tages in terms of higher name recognition, strong ties with
the local elites, and greater resources. Their presence in
politics may result in higher voter participation and a more
informed electorate, and therefore greater pressure on po-
litical representatives to deliver public goods.7
I check for the presence of such policy effects by running
regressions with state fixed effects in section VE. I then
provide evidence in section VI strongly suggesting that the
differences arose mainly in the colonial period and are
narrowing in the postcolonial period. I also directly test the
political channel using data from postcolonial elections on
voter turnout and measures of electoral competitiveness.
The second class of explanations focuses on differences
arising due to colonial policies. One potential hypothesis is that
colonial rulers might set up poor institutions in places where
they do not intend to settle over the long term. For instance,
property rights may be poorly protected, or there might be an
insufficient focus on investments that primarily benefit the
local population rather than the colonial power.8 This is very
plausible in the Indian context, because the British did not
settle in India in large numbers: as late as 1911, the proportion
of Christians in India was less than 1.3% of the population.
Presumably indirectly ruled areas, with rulers who belonged to
that region, were likely to make better institutional choices.
I test this hypothesis by focusing on one important
institution: the land revenue system. Land revenue was the
largest source of government revenue for both British India
and the native states. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) have shown
that areas with landlord-based revenue systems, where land-
lords were in charge of revenue collection, have worse
long-run outcomes compared to places with cultivator-
based systems, where the ruler collected the revenue di-
rectly from the cultivators. The former system resulted in
greater land inequality and could indirectly have led to worse
governance by the colonial state, since most of the gains of any
productivity improvements would be captured by the land-
lords.9 This paper differs in two important ways: the analysis of
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) does not include the indirectly ruled
areas, and they find that the primary channel of influence is
through the impact of historical institutions on postcolonial
policy. In section VII, I extend the analysis to include indirectly
ruled areas and find a much more nuanced result.
A second version of the extractive institutions hypothesis
is that colonial rulers might resort to excessive taxation as
part of a strategy to extract the colony’s resources to the
benefit of the colonial power and that they might be able to
do this more effectively in directly ruled areas. In India,
Mukherjee (1972) estimates the extent of economic drain
from India to Britain to be of the order of 0.04% to 0.07%
of national income over the period 1840 to 1900, which is
not very large. British colonial rulers also imposed signifi-
cant tribute obligations on the native states, so it is not clear
that the burden of drain would be different across the two
types of areas. I explicitly compare tax collections across
British areas and the native states and examine whether this
can explain the differences in long-term outcomes.
A third possibility is that the rulers of native states had
better incentives, compared to British administrators, to
provide public goods to their subjects. The historical record
indicates two key institutional differences. First, native
states rulers had much longer tenures than British adminis-
trators, which might play a role in undertaking long-term
investments such as schools or health facilities.10 The na-
tives states in our data set had, on average, between four and
five kings over the period 1858 to 1947, while British India
was ruled by 24 different governors-general. Lower-level
administrators had even higher rates of turnover: in 1936,
two-thirds of district officers in British India had held their
posts for less than one year (Potter, 1996). Second, as
described in section IIB, the British reserved the right to
depose native state rulers if they governed badly enough to
provoke widespread protest. This was a credible threat: 21
of the 71 native states in our data set had their king deposed
in the period 1858 to 1947. They were usually replaced by
a relative (brother, son, cousin), but this would still mean a
significant diminution in wealth and personal status for the
7 There are two offsetting factors to this. First, higher electoral advan-
tages may translate into lower incentives for politicians to actually deliver
public goods, and, second, areas under direct British rule had a longer
experience with democratic processes, since provincial elections had been
held in these areas during the colonial period following the Government
of India Act of 1935. An early study by Richter (1975) finds lower voter
turnout and higher victory margins for candidates in native state constit-
uencies in the elections of 1957, 1962, and 1967. However, this analysis
does not control for omitted variables or selection into direct rule.
8 Several previous studies have highlighted the role of such factors.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that colonies where settlement was deterred
by the disease environment have poorer indicators of property rights
protection, and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) find that Pacific islands that
were colonized during the era of Enlightenment have better outcomes in
the long run.
9 This is particularly the case for landlord-based areas where revenue
commitments to the British colonial rulers had been fixed in perpetuity,
leaving the landlords as residual claimants. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) also
document other channels through which this historical institution plays a role.
10 Some empirical work in other settings support this hypothesis. Rauch
(1995) demonstrates that city mayors in the United States with longer tenures
have a higher likelihood of undertaking long-term infrastructure projects,
while Do and Iyer (2008) show that Vietnamese farmers who are assured of
a longer tenure on their land are more likely to plant long-term crops.
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previous king. British administrators were promoted on the
basis of seniority (Das, 2001); the usual penalty for bad
performance was transfer to another district.11 In section
VII, I test whether the quality of governance during the
colonial period matters for long-term outcomes by testing
whether outcomes vary across native states whose rulers
were deposed for misrule and those whose rulers were never
deposed.
IV. Comparing Areas under Direct and Indirect Rule
A. Data
I compare outcomes across British India and native state
areas using district-level data from the postindependence
period. A district in India is an administrative division below
state level. In 1991, India had 415 districts in seventeen
major states,12 a district on average having an area of 7,500
square kilometers and a population of 1.5 million. The
major reason I use district-level data is that for each modern
district, I am able to use old and new maps to find out
whether it was part of the British Empire or a native state as
of 1947. This is much harder to do for state-level data
because modern state boundaries in India are completely
different from older native state or British province bound-
aries, mainly due to the 1956 reorganization of states on a
linguistic basis.
For each district, I create a British dummy, which equals
1 if the district was formerly part of British India. Some
modern districts comprise several native states, and some
native states were large enough to extend over several
modern districts. A few districts contain areas from both the
British Empire and the native states, in which case the
British dummy is assigned to be 1 if the major part of
the district belonged to the British Empire. This will be
the main independent variable in the analysis.
One major drawback of district-level data in India is the
absence of data on per capita income, consumption, or net
domestic product (these are available only at the state level).
I therefore conduct my analysis using other proxies for
economic well-being. The major outcomes I consider are
measures of agricultural investment and productivity (agri-
culture accounted for 37% of India’s total GDP and 67% of
the working population in 1981); the availability of public
goods such as schools, health centers, and roads; and health
and education outcomes. In addition, I analyze data on the
relative size of the manufacturing sector in district employ-
ment, as well as district-level poverty estimates from To-
palova (2005). Data sources are listed in appendix B.
B. OLS Estimates of the Impact of Direct Colonial Rule
I first run OLS regressions of the form
yi    Briti  Xi  i, (1)
where yi is an outcome variable for district i, Briti is a
dummy for whether the district was part of the (directly
ruled) British Empire, and Xi are other district characteris-
tics (mainly geography). Since some native states extended
over several districts and the main dependent variable Briti
is assigned at the native state level, I compute standard
errors clustered at the level of the native state to take into
account possible correlation in outcomes across districts
that used to be part of the same native state.13
The regression in equation (1) may not indicate a causal
effect of having direct British rule, because the main de-
pendent variable, Briti, is potentially endogenous. For in-
stance, if it were the case that the British annexed the areas
with the most potential for agricultural productivity, then the
OLS regression would yield an overestimate of the causal
impact of British rule. It is also possible that only the most
unproductive areas came under British rule (because local
rulers did not put much effort in defending these areas). In
this case, the OLS regression provides an underestimate of
the impact of direct British rule.
In fact, we see that areas annexed to the British Empire
have significantly higher rainfall and a significantly lower
proportion of barren or rocky areas, compared to areas that
were part of native states (table 2). This suggests that British
annexation policy was selective and geared toward picking
out the areas that were likely to be more favorable to
agriculture. There are no significant differences in other
geographic characteristics such as latitude, altitude, or ma-
jor soil types. I will be controlling for geographic variables
in all the regressions, but these differences could indicate
the presence of other unobserved differences, which might
bias the OLS estimates.
To identify the causal impact of direct rule, I need an
exogenous determinant of annexation. For this, I make use
of Lord Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse, according to which
the British would take over a native state if its ruler died
without a natural heir. I argue that this is a plausibly
exogenous determinant of whether a district became part of
the British Empire and use this as an instrument to estimate
the impact of British rule. Before describing this strategy in
detail in section V, I briefly discuss the results from the
estimation of equation (1).
C. Does the Mode of Annexation Matter?
A simple comparison of British areas with native state
areas suggests that British areas have significantly higher11 In fact, Potter (1996) cites the incompetence of officers as one of the
reasons for the relatively short tenure of officers in a given district.
12 The states in our analysis are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat,
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,
Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. These states accounted for 96% of India’s
population in 2001.
13 For British Empire areas, “native states” for the purpose of clustering
are assigned according to region and date of annexation. For instance, all
areas annexed from Mysore after the 1792 Mysore War are grouped
together as belonging to the same native state.
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agricultural investments and productivity in the postcolonial
period and slightly lower levels of infrastructure at the
village level, such as schools, health centers, canals, and
roads (tables 3 and 4). Each entry in table 3 and table 4
represents the coefficient from a regression of the form (1)
for the listed dependent variables (for example, irrigation,
fertilizer). Over the period 1956 to 1987, former British
Empire areas had a higher proportion of irrigated area,
greater fertilizer use, faster adoption of high-yielding vari-
eties, and, consequently, higher agricultural yields. Break-
ing out the results by mode of annexation employed sug-
gests that the selective annexation story might be relevant:
areas annexed through either cession, misrule, or conquest
do better than areas annexed due to lapse, or death of a
native ruler without an heir. We find a similar trend for the
results on village-level infrastructure. Although the differ-
ences are generally not statistically significant, areas an-
nexed by means of lapse have significantly lower levels of
most of these infrastructure variables (table 4). All the
results are very similar when I use the number of years
under direct British rule as the main independent variable
rather than a dummy for British rule.14
V. IV Estimates of the Impact of Direct Colonial Rule
A. Does the Period of Annexation Matter?
Places that came under direct British rule are likely to be
systematically different from places that did not. This is
likely to be of greater significance for early annexations,
since they were mainly annexed by conquest, for which the
British had to expend considerable resources. As a first step
toward controlling for this selectivity in annexation, I com-
pare areas that were annexed by the British toward the end
of the annexation period (on or after 1848) with those that
were never annexed. In this period, many of the annexations
were not by conquest, and hence the selection bias is likely
to be smaller than in the full sample. I find that the directly
14 The number of years under direct British rule is highly correlated with
the British dummy; the correlation coefficient is 0.84.
TABLE 2.—DIFFERENCES IN GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS
Variable
Number of
Districts
Number of
Native States
Mean
Difference
(s.e.)British Empire Native States
Geography
Latitude (degrees north) 407 98 23.29 22.79 0.509
(1.813)
Altitude (meters above sea level) 359 92 392.63 413.27 20.64
(58.73)
Mean annual rainfall (mm) 414 98 1503.41 1079.16 424.35***
(151.08)
Coastal district (dummy) 415 98 0.1264 0.0822 0.0442
(0.0597)
Proportion sandy 378 96 0.0079 0.0117 0.0038
(0.0074)
Proportion barren/rocky 378 96 0.0050 0.0121 0.0070**
(0.0028)
Top soil types
Black soil (dummy) 362 93 0.1568 0.2937 0.1369
(0.1075)
Alluvial soil (dummy) 362 93 0.5254 0.4921 0.0334
(0.1301)
Red soil (dummy) 362 93 0.2203 0.0952 0.1251
(0.0776)
Demographic variables
Log (population) 323 93 14.42 13.83 0.591***
(0.155)
Population density (persons/km2) 322 93 279.47 169.20 110.27**
(41.66)
Proportion rural 323 93 0.8210 0.8182 0.0028
(0.0154)
Proportion of working population in farming 323 93 0.6961 0.7072 0.0111
(0.0239)
Proportion scheduled caste 323 93 0.1567 0.1512 0.0055
(0.0148)
Proportion scheduled tribe 323 93 0.0859 0.0973 0.0114
(0.0271)
Proportion literate 323 93 0.3234 0.2867 0.0367
(0.0283)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Data are 1991 district level for geographic variables and 1961 district level for demographic variables. Demographic data are computed as the mean from the censuses of 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991. Population density
figures exclude 1991 data. Data sources listed in table A.2.
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ruled areas no longer have any significant agricultural ad-
vantages and continue to have slightly lower levels of public
goods provision (see tables 7 and 8, column 3). This suggests
that selection bias is likely to be a major confounding factor. I
now construct instrumental variable estimates as a more pre-
cise way to control for the selectivity in annexation.
B. Doctrine of Lapse
Lord Dalhousie, governor-general of India from 1848 to
1856, articulated an unusual policy of annexation in 1848:
“I hold that on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail,
the territory should be made to lapse and adoption should
not be permitted, excepting in those cases in which some
strong political reason may render it expedient to depart
from this general rule.” He used this policy to annex several
states where Indian rulers died without a natural heir. Eight
native states (comprising twenty modern districts) had rul-
ers die without a natural heir during the governorship of
Lord Dalhousie. Of these, four native states (Satara, Sam-
balpur, Jhansi, and Nagpur), comprising sixteen districts,
were successfully annexed. The other four did not become
part of the British Empire due to various reasons: the
annexation of Ajaigarh was reversed by Dalhousie’s succes-
sor, Lord Canning; the annexation of Karauli was disal-
lowed by the East India Company’s court of directors;
Orccha was allowed to adopt an heir because of a prior
agreement; and in Chhatarpur, a nephew of the king, was
allowed to succeed.15 We should note that in each of these
cases, Lord Dalhousie recommended applying the policy of
lapse, so the fact that these areas were ultimately not
annexed was not a result of Dalhousie’s selectively applying
the policy of lapse but of factors beyond his control.
Of the remaining 65 native states (161 districts) where
such a lapse did not occur, Lord Dalhousie annexed only 3
(18 districts). These were the states of Punjab, Berar, and
Oudh, which were annexed by means of conquest, nonpay-
ment of debt, and misrule, respectively.16 The policy of
lapse thus meant that areas where the ruler died without a
natural heir had a higher probability of being annexed. This
is confirmed by our first-stage regressions, which are dis-
cussed in detail in section VC.
Lord Dalhousie’s policy was in contrast to the policies
followed by several earlier British administrators who recog-
nized adoptions by native rulers. In fact, rulers dying without
natural heirs was not an unusual occurrence during this cen-
tury. For instance, table 5 shows that in the period 1835 to 1847
(immediately before Dalhousie came to India), fifteen rulers
died without natural heirs, but only one of these states was
annexed. This meant that Dalhousie’s policy was an unex-
pected event for the native states; not surprisingly, it was
extremely unpopular among the native rulers. This policy was
withdrawn when the British Crown took over the administra-
tion in 1858; in fact, official documents guaranteeing British
recognition of adopted heirs were sent out to native rulers to
15 The historical details are presented in appendix C.
16 Lord Dalhousie also annexed the small states of Jaitpur, Udaipur, and
Baghat, of which the latter two annexations were reversed by Lord
Canning.
TABLE 3.—DIFFERENCES IN AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY: OLS ESTIMATES
British Dummy
British Dummy Interacted with Mode of
Annexation
Years of Direct
British Rule
(1/100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Controls Geography Controls Conquest Ceded Misrule Lapse
Dependent variables (1956–1987 mean)
Proportion of area irrigated 0.111*** 0.099*** 0.069 0.152*** 0.113** 0.062 0.079***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.051) (0.043) (0.047) (0.046) (0.024)
Fertilizer usage (kg/hectare) 8.428** 7.014** 4.943 10.542*** 13.731** 1.485 5.563***
(3.541) (3.073) (4.308) (2.803) (5.741) (2.717) (1.910)
Proportion of cereal area sown with
high-yielding varieties
0.074** 0.066** 0.046 0.103*** 0.073** 0.041* 0.053***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.039) (0.033) (0.035) (0.022) (0.019)
Log total yield (15 major crops) 0.381*** 0.213*** 0.210** 0.236** 0.282*** 0.076 0.194***
(0.121) (0.080) (0.103) (0.112) (0.077) (0.092) (0.051)
Log rice yield 0.135 0.151* 0.220** 0.106 0.128* 0.023 0.135**
(0.112) (0.083) (0.106) (0.096) (0.077) (0.090) (0.056)
Log wheat yield 0.002 0.064 0.017 0.076 0.133* 0.185 0.006
(0.170) (0.088) (0.091) (0.104) (0.072) (0.204) (0.057)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren No Yes Yes Yes
Soil type dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 271 271 271 271
Number of native states 83 83 83 83
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Each cell represents the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable, which is a dummy for direct British rule in columns 1 and 2, the dummy interacted with other
variables in columns 3 and 4, and number of years of direct. British rule in column 5. Data are missing for the states of Kerala, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh. All data are at the 1961 district level.
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reassure them against any future doctrines of lapse. This lends
greater validity to our identifying assumption that the policy of
lapse provides an exogenous determinant of British annex-
ation, since the death of a ruler without a natural heir in the
specific period 1848 to 1856 is likely to be a matter of
circumstance rather than caused by systematic factors that
might also affect long-term outcomes.
C. Constructing an Instrumental Variable for Direct
Colonial Rule
For each native state, I construct an instrumental variable
Lapse as follows: Lapse equals 1 if the native state was not
annexed before 1848 and the ruler died without an heir in
the period 1848 to 1856; Lapse equals 0 if the native state
was not annexed before 1848 and such a death did not occur
during the period 1848 to 1856. Lapse cannot be assigned to
places that were annexed before 1848, since these were
already ruled by the British. Since the policy of lapse was
irrelevant for places that were annexed before Lord Dalhou-
sie came to India in 1848, the sample for the IV regressions
necessarily consists of places that had not been annexed in
or before 1847 (hereafter referred to as the post-1847
sample). The sample thus consists of native states that were
never annexed (Brit  0, Lapse  0 or 1), those that were
annexed due to lapse after 1847 (Brit  1, Lapse  1), and
those that were annexed after 1847 by other means (Brit  1,
Lapse 0). Using Lapse as an instrument for Brit would yield
consistent estimates as long as Lapse itself does not have a
TABLE 4.—DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC GOODS LEVELS: OLS ESTIMATES
British Dummy British Dummy Interacted with Mode of Annexation
Years of Direct
British Rule
(1/100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Controls
Geography
Controls
Geography 
Soil Controls Conquest Ceded Misrule Lapse
Dependent variables: Proportion of villages having public goods (mean of 1981 and 1991 data)
Primary school 0.035 0.016 0.007 0.035 0.121*** 0.062** 0.007 0.027
(0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.042) (0.028) (0.029) (0.022)
Middle school 0.035 0.046 0.033 0.008 0.106*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.050**
(0.046) (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.038) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023)
High school 0.045 0.068* 0.059 0.041 0.112** 0.096*** 0.081** 0.061**
(0.049) (0.040) (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) (0.034) (0.037) (0.026)
Primary health center 0.010 0.024* 0.019 0.018 0.036** 0.023* 0.029** 0.022**
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Primary health subcenter 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.017 0.033* 0.005 0.037** 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
Canals 0.028 0.010 0.011 0.001 0.021 0.029** 0.022* 0.005
(0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Roads 0.028 0.043 0.077 0.066 0.033 0.097* 0.113** 0.007
(0.072) (0.065) (0.064) (0.095) (0.051) (0.055) (0.044) (0.053)
Combined public goods 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.008 0.057** 0.026 0.055*** 0.024
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Soil type dummies No No Yes No No
Number of districts 404 377 340 377 377
Number of native states 97 96 92 96 96
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Each cell represents the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable, which is a dummy for British rule in columns 1–3, the dummy interacted with other variables
in columns 4 and 5, and number of years of direct British rule in column 6. Data are missing for middle schools in Gujarat, high schools in Madhya Pradesh, and primary health subcenters in Karnataka. Data are
missing for Assam in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.
TABLE 5.—DEATHS OF INDIAN RULERS WITHOUT NATURAL HEIRS
Period Governor-Generals
Ruler Died without an Heir Annexed Due to Lapse Annexed Due to Other Reasons
Number of
Native States
Number of
Districts
Number of
Native States
Number of
Districts
Number of
Native States
Number of
Districts
1819–1827 Hastings, Amherst 5 14 0 0 3 17
1828–1835 Bentinck, Metcalfe 6 9 0 0 2 4
1836–1847 Auckland, Ellenborough, Hardinge 15 31 1 1 4 19
1848–1856 Dalhousie 8 20 4 16 3 18
1857–1863 Canning, Elgin 6 10 0 0 1 1
1864–1875 Lawrence, Mayo, Northbrook 7 20 0 0 0 0
1876–1884 Lytton, Ripon 3 5 0 0 0 0
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direct impact on outcomes, even if there was some selectivity
in British annexation among places with Lapse  1.17
The first-stage regression for the IV strategy is:
Briti  	0  	1Lapsei  	2Xi  ui, (2)
where Lapsei is as defined above and Xi are other control
variables (mainly geography).
As expected from the historical description, the Lapse
dummy is a statistically significant predictor of the Brit
dummy, while geographic variables do not predict British
annexation in the period after 1848 (table 6). Further,
annexation is predicted by the interaction of two events: the
ruler dying in the 1848–1856 period and the ruler dying
without an heir and not by either of these separately (table
6, column 4). As expected, Lapse predicts British annex-
ation even better if I drop the native states annexed for other
reasons (table 6, column 5).
D. Instrumental Variable Estimates
As suggested by the comparison of late-annexed places
with the native states, the instrumental variable estimates
show no significant advantages for directly ruled areas in
terms of agricultural investments and productivity measures
(table 7). All the IV estimates are smaller in magnitude than
the OLS estimates and statistically insignificant (table 7,
column 4). Further, the coefficients for fertilizer use, total
yield, and rice yield are significantly different from the OLS
estimates for the full sample. These results are robust to
excluding the areas annexed by Lord Dalhousie for non-
lapse reasons (table 7, column 5). The concern here is that
these might be the “best” areas in some sense, since the
British went to the trouble of annexing them even when the
rulers did not die without natural heirs.18 The difference
between the OLS and the IV results suggests a high degree
of selectivity in British annexation policy, with annexation
directed toward acquiring areas with the highest agricultural
potential. This is not surprising in view of the fact that land
revenue was the biggest source of government revenue
throughout the colonial period. The mostly insignificant IV
estimates in turn imply that British rule had no significant
causal impact on long-term agricultural outcomes.
This lack of a causal effect on agricultural outcomes is
not offset by directly ruled areas moving resources to other
17 See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a detailed explanation of this
point.
18 Note that since we have potentially removed the best places from the
Lapse  0 group, these results are likely to be biased upward.
TABLE 6.—FIRST STAGE OF IV STRATEGY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BRITISH DUMMY
Post-1847 Sample
No Controls Geography Soils Main Effects Exclude Punjab, Berar, Oudh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruler died without natural heir in 1848–1856
(Instrument)
0.682*** 0.673*** 0.669*** 0.953*** 0.771***
(0.159) (0.155) (0.162) (0.176) (0.140)
Main effects
Ruler died without heir 0.231* 0.027
(0.126) (0.121)
Ruler died in 1848–1856 period 0.161 0.013
(0.101) (0.023)
Geography controls
Latitude 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002)
Mean annual rainfall 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coastal dummy 0.120 0.096 0.067 0.016
(0.082) (0.100) (0.089) (0.024)
Proportion sandy 0.289 0.119 0.085 0.033
(0.242) (0.241) (0.113) (0.061)
Proportion barren/rocky 2.791 2.744 2.188 1.279
(1.773) (1.774) (1.839) (1.171)
Altitude (1/1000) 0.000
(0.000)
Black soil dummy 0.091
(0.091)
Alluvial soil dummy 0.027
(0.085)
Red soil dummy 0.030
(0.071)
Number of districts 181 163 152 163 145
Number of native states 73 71 67 71 68
R2 0.29 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.73
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
***Significant at 1%.
Post-1847 sample refers to areas that were not annexed in or before 1847. All results are from linear regressions. Main effect “Ruler died without heir” is a dummy that equals 1 if the native state had a ruler
die without an heir at any time after 1818. Main effect “Ruler died in 1848–1856” is a dummy that equals 1 if the ruler of the native state died in the period 1848–1856.
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sectors. For instance, the directly ruled areas have a similar
proportion of their workforce employed in manufacturing
compared to indirectly ruled areas over the period 1961 to
1991. IV results for 1991 alone indicate that indirectly ruled
areas in fact have a slightly higher proportion of their
workforce in manufacturing (table A.1).
Turning to the availability of health and education infra-
structure, the IV estimates indicate a statistically significant
negative impact of direct British rule on the availability of
middle schools, health centers, and roads (table 8, column
4). The IV estimates imply very large differences in public
goods availability: districts that were part of the British
Empire have 37% fewer villages with middle schools, 70%
fewer villages equipped with primary health subcenters, and
46% fewer villages with access to good roads in 1981 and
1991.
These differences in access to health and education facil-
ities have implications for development outcomes. The IV
estimates show that infant mortality rates were significantly
higher in British areas (table 9). We see no significant
differences in literacy rates, which probably reflects the fact
that the differences in primary schools are no longer signif-
icant in the 1981 and 1991 data. In terms of overall welfare,
we find that areas under direct rule have significantly higher
proportions of their population below the poverty line over
the period 1983 to 1993. These differences are very large in
magnitude: directly ruled British areas have nearly 40%
higher poverty rates and 33% higher infant mortality rates in
the early 1990s compared to native state areas. These gains
are also more widespread in the sense that native state areas
have lower levels of consumption inequality during these
periods.
I perform a number of specification checks for the IV
results before discussing the validity of this instrumental
variable strategy. The IV estimates are robust to dropping
the areas annexed by Lord Dalhousie for nonlapse reasons
(table 8, column 6), to the addition of soil type dummies
(the overall estimate for the combined public goods regres-
sion is 0.062), and to controlling for population density
(overall public goods difference is now 0.057), though
population density is probably endogenous in this context,
since it has the potential of being affected by public health
policies.19 The results are also robust to dropping the native
states of Mysore and Travancore, which were arguably the
best in terms of public goods provision. The religion of the
ruler has some impact: areas ruled by Sikh kings were much
more likely to have better postcolonial outcomes, while
there are few significant differences between the areas ruled
by Hindu or Muslim kings (table A.2).
D. Assessing the Validity of Lapse as an Instrument
The validity of the identification strategy rests on the
assumption that Lapse is a legitimate instrument for British
rule. This means that Lapse must be uncorrelated with the
residual error term  in equation (1). In other words, if the
event of ruler death without a natural heir in the period 1848
19 This was especially true in the colonial period when the major cause
of death was from epidemics and famines.
TABLE 7.—DIFFERENCES IN AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY: IV ESTIMATES
Coefficient
Mean of Dependent
Variable
British Dummy,
Full Sample
British Dummy,
Post-1847 Sample
British Dummy,
Post-1847 Sample
British Dummy, Post-1847 Sample
(excluding Punjab, Oudh, Berar)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variables (1956–1987 mean)
Proportion of area irrigated 0.228 0.099*** 0.063 0.059 0.058
(0.037) (0.046) (0.065) (0.053)
Fertilizer usage (kg/hectare) 20.04 7.014** 3.770 3.145 2.054
(3.073) (4.251) (3.765) (2.669)
Proportion of cereal area sown
with high-yielding varieties
0.330 0.066** 0.083** 0.051 0.061*
(0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033)
Log total yield (15 major
crops)
0.161 0.213*** 0.117 0.087 0.082
(0.080) (0.119) (0.127) (0.105)
Log rice yield 0.077 0.151* 0.046 0.107 0.090
(0.083) (0.120) (0.215) (0.166)
Log wheat yield 0.114 0.064 0.089 0.184 0.164
(0.088) (0.113) (0.243) (0.219)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes Yes
Soil type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 271 136 136 118
Number of native states 83 58 58 55
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
IV estimates computed using the Lapse dummy as an instrument for British rule. Lapse  1 if ruler died without a natural heir in the period 1848–1856. Post-1847 sample refers to areas that were not annexed
in or before 1847. Data are missing for the states of Kerala, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh. All data are at the 1961 district level.
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to 1856 influences long-term outcomes for reasons other
than British annexation, or if the areas with Lapse  1 are
in some way different from other areas, then the instrumen-
tal variable estimates are no longer consistent. In this
section, I consider various arguments that might affect the
validity of my instrument. Some of these arguments are
countered by the historical evidence and some by direct
econometric tests. I run most of these tests on the reduced-
form specification, the results of which are very similar to
the IV specification (table 10, column 1).20
First, Lapse may not be a valid instrument if the policy
was tailored toward acquiring native states with certain
characteristics. The historical evidence does not support the
case that the Doctrine of Lapse was put in place in order to
obtain any specific states. In particular, Lord Dalhousie
admitted that the states he most wanted were Oudh and
Hyderabad;21 however, neither of these could be annexed by
lapse, since the rulers of both states already had natural heirs
when Dalhousie arrived in India. They were in fact annexed
by other means.22 The Doctrine of Lapse thus seems to have
20 Since we have a case of one endogenous variable and one instrument,
the IV coefficients are exactly equal to the reduced-form coefficients
divided by the coefficient on the instrument in the first stage.
21
“I have got two other kingdoms on hand to dispose of—Oudh and
Hyderabad. Both are on the highroad to be taken under our management.”
Private correspondence of Lord Dalhousie in 1848, quoted in Rahim
(1963).
22 The ruler of Oudh was accused of misrule, and part of Hyderabad was
annexed due to nonpayment of debts.
TABLE 8.—DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC GOODS LEVELS: IV ESTIMATES
Coefficient
Mean of Dependent
Variable
British Dummy,
Full Sample
British Dummy,
Post-1847 Sample
British Dummy,
Post-1847 Sample
British Dummy, Post-1847 Sample
(excluding Punjab, Oudh, Berar)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variables: Proportion of villages having public goods (mean of 1981 and 1991 data)
Primary school 0.7720 0.016 0.007 0.011 0.012
(0.032) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036)
Middle school 0.2485 0.046 0.047 0.091** 0.083**
(0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032)
High school 0.1260 0.068* 0.061* 0.065 0.064*
(0.040) (0.033) (0.042) (0.037)
Primary health center 0.0415 0.024* 0.015* 0.031** 0.028**
(0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Primary health subcenter 0.0753 0.002 0.007 0.053** 0.043***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016)
Canals 0.0477 0.010 0.024* 0.043 0.041*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.024)
Roads 0.4344 0.043 0.010 0.198*** 0.157***
(0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.050)
Combined public goods 0.2535 0.017 0.026 0.075*** 0.065***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 377 163 163 145
Number of native states 96 71 71 68
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
IV estimate computed using the Lapse dummy as an instrument for British rule. Lapse  1 if ruler died without a natural heir in the period 1848–1856. Post-1847 sample refers to areas that were not annexed in or before
1847. Data are missing for middle schools in Gujarat, high schools in Madhya Pradesh, and primary health subcenters in Karnataka. Data are missing for Assam in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.
TABLE 9.—HEALTH AND EDUCATION OUTCOMES
Dependent Variables Mean
Coefficient
British Dummy,
Full Sample
British Dummy,
Post-1847 Sample
OLS IV
Literacy rate (1961, 1971,
1981, 1991)
0.309 0.017 0.019
(0.022) (0.042)
Infant mortality rate 1981 118.7 0.481 37.35**
(7.48) (14.20)
Infant mortality rate 1991 80.04 0.772 26.87**
(6.36) (10.54)
Poverty 1983 0.436 0.093** 0.223**
(0.037) (0.097)
Poverty 1987 0.375 0.048 0.139**
(0.042) (0.064)
Poverty 1993 0.315 0.066* 0.123***
(0.034) (0.044)
Inequality 1983 0.500 0.021* 0.064***
(0.011) (0.014)
Inequality 1987 0.460 0.011 0.045*
(0.013) (0.023)
Inequality 1993 0.428 0.002 0.079**
(0.018) (0.032)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes
Number of districts 377 157
Number of native states 96 69
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Post-1847 sample refers to areas that were not annexed in or before 1847. Instrument is a dummy for
whether the ruler died without an heir in the period 1848–1856. Infant mortality rate is computed as the
number of deaths per 1,000 live births. The measure of poverty is the head count ratio, which measures
the proportion of people below the poverty line in a district. The measure of inequality is the standard
deviation of log consumption. The number of observations for the poverty and inequality regressions is
360 for the OLS regressions and 160 for the IV regressions.
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been an additional means to annex more territory and was
not targeted to any particular state.
Second, the instrument may be called into question if the
British deliberately caused the death of certain rulers.
Again, the historical evidence does not indicate any such
moves on their part, and they were never accused of this
even by the royal families affected by the Doctrine of Lapse.
A related issue is the question of whether some native states
established take natural heirs to avoid being taken over by
lapse. The unexpected nature of Dalhousie’s policy and the
prominence of royal families suggest that this was not very
easy to do; there are also no accounts of the British being
suspicious of the bona fides of natural heirs.
Third, it is possible that the event of a ruler dying without
an heir might reflect some characteristics of the area (such
as bad climate) or of the ruling family (such as genetic
weaknesses), which might arguably affect long-term out-
comes directly. To control for this, I reran the regressions of
public goods on the Lapse dummy after adding dummies for
ruler death in the 1848 to 1856 period (as a proxy for poor
conditions in those years) and for the ruler ever dying
without heirs in the post-1818 period (as a proxy for a
physically weak royal family). The estimates obtained are in
fact larger in magnitude than the specification without these
controls (table 10, column 2). Further, these controls are
usually insignificant in all the regressions.
Fourth, I checked directly whether ruler death without
natural heirs has any long-term impact on public goods
availability without British annexation. For instance, such a
death may result in an extended period of political turmoil,
which might have lasting consequences. As mentioned ear-
lier, the policy of lapse was officially given up after 1858. I
regress public goods outcomes on a dummy that equals 1 if
the ruler died without a natural heir in the period 1858 to
1884 during which such a death would not result in British
annexation.23 The estimates using this “fake instrument” are
much lower in magnitude than the results using the Lapse
dummy, and they are also statistically insignificant (table
10, column 3). This falsification test strongly supports the
hypothesis that the impact of Lapse is only through British
annexation.
Fifth, it was not the case that territories annexed by lapse
were administered differently compared to areas annexed by
other means. The lapsed areas were added to existing British
provinces and brought under the prevailing administrative
23 There were twelve such deaths in ten native states of our data set.
TABLE 10.—REDUCED-FORM REGRESSIONS FOR PUBLIC GOODS: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Coefficient
Lapse Dummy:
Post-1847
Sample, Base
Specification
Lapse Dummy:
Post-1847
Sample, with
“Main Effects”
Fake Instrument:
Native States
Sample,
Falsification Test
Lapse Dummy:
Post-1847
Sample, State
Fixed Effects
Lapse Dummy:
Post-1847
Sample, Exact
p-Values
Lapse Dummy:
Post-1847 Sample,
Propensity Score
Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables: Proportion of villages having public goods (mean of 1981 and 1991 data)
Primary school 0.007 0.032 0.094** 0.002 0.007 0.009
(0.028) (0.050) (0.039) (0.027) [0.48] (0.026)
Middle school 0.061** 0.100* 0.006 0.028 0.061 0.023
(0.025) (0.052) (0.034) (0.019) [0.14] (0.022)
High school 0.049 0.048 0.067 0.023*** 0.049 0.016
(0.032) (0.059) (0.047) (0.008) [0.24] (0.014)
Primary health center 0.021*** 0.015 0.012 0.007* 0.021 0.006*
(0.008) (0.020) (0.016) (0.003) [0.14] (0.003)
Primary health subcenter 0.036*** 0.062** 0.011 0.014** 0.036 0.026**
(0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.007) [0.05] (0.010)
Canals 0.029** 0.128** 0.017 0.002 0.029 0.008
(0.015) (0.050) (0.041) (0.014) [0.11] (0.007)
Roads 0.134*** 0.142* 0.023 0.025*** 0.134 0.093**
(0.032) (0.083) (0.050) (0.009) [0.06] (0.024)
Combined public goods 0.051*** 0.079** 0.023 0.013* 0.051 0.023
(0.012) (0.030) (0.022) (0.008) [0.05] (0.027)
Combined public goods
(excluding primary schools)
0.058*** 0.087*** 0.011 0.016*** 0.058 0.029**
(0.012) (0.031) (0.023) (0.005) [0.01] (0.012)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 163 163 128 163 163 151
Number of native states 71 71 63 71 71 66
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Post-1847 sample refers to areas that were not annexed by 1847. Lapse dummy equals 1 if ruler died without a natural heir in the period 1848–1856. Column 2 includes dummies for whether the ruler died in
1848–1856 and whether the ruler ever died without an heir in the post-1818 period. “Fake instrument” is a dummy for whether the ruler died without an heir in the period 1858–1884. Column 5 shows p-values
(in square brackets) constructed by the randomization inference procedure, to adjust for possible small sample bias in clustering. Standard errors for propensity score matching estimates are computed using bootstrap.
Data are missing for middle schools in Gujarat, high schools in Madhya Pradesh and primary health subcenters in Karnataka. Data are missing for Assam in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.
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systems in those provinces. In particular, we should note that
they were integrated into different British provinces: Nagpur
and Sambalpur were merged with the Central Provinces, Satara
with Bombay, and Jhansi with the North-West Provinces. In
the postcolonial period as well, these areas belong to four
different states. I explicitly include state fixed effects to see
whether state-level policies can explain the differences be-
tween areas under direct and indirect rule. We see that many of
the public goods differences continue to be significant, though
they are lower in magnitude (table 10, column 4). Thus, the
results we observe cannot be fully attributed to a specific
administrative difference or state policy.
Sixth, the standard errors might be incorrect due to a
small sample bias. I correct for possible correlation of errors
within districts of the same native states by using the
method of clustering, but the consistency of these standard
errors requires a large sample. To account for this, I com-
pute exact finite-sample p-values for the estimates using the
method of randomization inference.24 This consists of reas-
signing the Lapse dummy randomly, computing the reduced-
form estimator, and simulating the finite sample distribution
of our estimator. The implied standard errors are larger than
the ones obtained by clustering, but our overall estimate is
still significant, with a p-value of 0.05 (table 10, column 5).
Finally, I present propensity score matching estimates for
the reduced-form regressions. The small size of the data set
does not make it particularly well suited for propensity
score matching methods.25 Nevertheless, the balancing
property was satisfied, and several of the propensity score
matching estimates are still statistically significant, though
the magnitudes are smaller than the baseline estimates (table
10, column 6). It is also worth pointing out that the coeffi-
cient for the combined public goods becomes larger
(0.034) when we do not include primary schools and also
becomes statistically significant.
These robustness checks support the conclusion that di-
rect British rule had a significant negative impact on the
availability of public goods in the postcolonial period.
VI. Differences in Outcomes in Earlier Periods
The differences in human capital investments I have
documented were present in the colonial period and are
narrowing over time in the postcolonial period, when British
areas and native states were subjected to a uniform system
of administration. I provide three pieces of evidence toward
this view. First, IV estimates using public goods data from
1961 show that British Empire areas had lower levels of
primary schools, middle schools, and medical dispensaries
in 1961, though as before, the OLS results do not indicate
any significant differences (table 11).26 Though the esti-
mated differences for middle and high schools are lower in
24 See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) for details.
25 See Zhao (2004) for some evidence that propensity score matching
does not work as well as other methods when the sample size is small.
26 The data on rural health centers, canals, and roads are missing for
several states in this year.
TABLE 11.—DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC GOODS LEVELS IN 1961 AND 1911
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Number of Districts
(Number of Native
States)
Coefficient
British Dummy,
OLS:
Full Sample
British Dummy,
IV:
Post-1847 Sample
British Dummy, IV:
Post-1847 Sample
(excluding Punjab, Oudh, Berar)
A: Proportion of villages having public goods in 1961
Primary school 0.5126 234 (81) 0.024 0.127* 0.106*
(0.041) (0.067) (0.062)
Middle school 0.0972 219 (78) 0.040 0.068* 0.058*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030)
High school 0.0303 286 (88) 0.032 0.037 0.031*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.018)
Dispensaries 0.0733 234 (81) 0.075* 0.069* 0.062*
(0.043) (0.039) (0.036)
Rural health center 0.0244 159 (54) 0.007 0.007 0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Canals 0.0017 134 (49) 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Roads 0.2124 234 (68) 0.052 0.077 0.047
(0.055) (0.092) (0.069)
B: 1911 census
Fraction literate 0.052 311 (121) 0.006 0.035* 0.029**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.014)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
Post-1847 sample refers to areas that were not annexed in or before 1847. Instrument is a dummy for whether the ruler died without an heir in the period 1848–1856. Data on rural health centers and canals are
missing for UP, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Orissa, and Maharashtra. Data on primary schools, middle schools, and dispensaries are missing for Uttar Pradesh. Data on middle schools, canals, and roads are missing
for West Bengal. Data on roads are missing for Punjab and Rajasthan. Regressions for 1911 literacy data are at the level of the native state for smaller native states and at the district level for larger native states
and British areas. Regressions include controls for total population and sex ratio.
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magnitude than the differences in table 10, they are larger as
a proportion of the mean level in 1961. It is also interesting
to note large differences in the availability of primary
schools, which are not present in the later period data.
Second, controlling explicitly for the 1961 level reduces
the magnitude and statistical significance of the results from
1981 to 1991 (table A.3), though some of the IV coefficients
are still significant at the 10% level of significance. We note
a similar trend in the infant mortality and poverty results in
table 9: the difference in the later periods is smaller (in
percentage terms) than in the earlier period. This is consis-
tent with the strong convergence effects on public goods
provision documented in Banerjee and Somanathan (2007),
mainly due to the explicit commitments by the Indian
government to equalize access to public goods. On the other
hand, there does not seem to be any noticeable time path in
the agricultural outcomes: the OLS and IV results for 1956
(the first year for which I have data) are not statistically
difference from the overall results, except for fertilizer use
where the difference is insignificant in the early periods but
becomes larger in the later periods (regressions not shown).
Overall, these results strongly suggest that postcolonial
institutions did not contribute to the differences in outcomes
across areas with direct and indirect rule and may in fact
have mitigated some of these differences. I also test this
directly by examining whether one specific postcolonial
institution, electoral democracy, worked differently across
areas of direct and indirect rule. As detailed in section III,
this is an institution that might function differently across
these two types of areas. Using data on state-level elections
from the 1960s and from the 1980s, I find that there are no
significant differences in voter turnout or the vote margin of
the winning candidates, a proxy for the competitiveness of
elections (table A.4).
Third, I use literacy data from the 1911 census to provide
direct evidence of human capital differences in the colonial
period. Though the overall level of literacy was very low
during this period (only 5.2% of the population could read
and write), the literacy rate in British areas was 3 percentage
points lower (table 11, panel B). This is in contrast to the
lack of any literacy difference in the postcolonial period
(table 9), which is consistent with the differences in the
availability of primary schools being wiped out by postco-
lonial policy.
Historical descriptions also indicate that at least some
native states were greatly committed to investments in
education and health during the colonial period. For in-
stance, the native state of Mysore carried out smallpox
vaccination as early as 1806. The state of Travancore
announced a policy of free primary education in 1817,
whereas the East India Company decided to give assistance
“to the more extended and systematic promotion of general
education in India” only after the influential dispatch written
by Sir Charles Wood in 1854. The state of Baroda was
probably the first to introduce compulsory primary educa-
tion in 1892, while the British passed a compulsory educa-
tion act in the nearby Central Provinces only in 1920. Roy
(2000) also notes that “the British government did not build
an effective mass education system.”
VII. Why Did the Native States Provide More Public
Goods?
In this section, I examine specific institutional differences
across areas with direct and indirect rule in the colonial
period, as discussed in section III. I first verify that the
differences in public goods are not explained by differences
in the level of taxes collected by the native states. We should
note that native states raised more revenues from their
subjects than the British did: revenue figures from the 1890s
indicate that the native states raised 3.42 rupees per capita in
revenue, while the corresponding figure for British India
was only 2.47 rupees.27 I reran the IV regression and added
a control variable for taxes collected per capita in 1896. The
coefficient on the dummy for direct British rule remains
almost unchanged, while the tax variable is never statisti-
cally significant (table 12, column 2).
The second institution I examine is the type of land
revenue system. We find that native states are not more
likely to have a different land revenue system on average:
63% of native state districts are classified as having cultivator-
based systems compared to 62% of British districts. Con-
trolling for this important historical institution reduces the
magnitude of the differences on the direct rule dummy, but
the overall difference remains significant at the 10% level of
significance, and the land revenue system variable itself is
rarely statistically significant (table 12, column 3). I inves-
tigate this relationship further by looking at the impact of
land revenue systems separately within British and native
state areas. I find that a cultivator-based land revenue
system is associated with better public goods outcomes
within British areas, consistent with the results of Banerjee
and Iyer (2005), but that the land revenue system does not
matter within native state areas (table A.5, columns 1 and
2).28 Taken together with the overall negative effects of
direct rule, these results suggest that having a more equita-
ble land revenue system can mitigate the effects of direct
colonial rule. If we think of having an intermediary landlord
class as another way of instituting indirect rule, the key
27 The revenue and tribute data were obtained from Chakrabarti (1896).
Native states paid tribute to the British out of their revenues; subtracting
this from their collections and adding the tribute amount to the British
revenues means that native states had 3.20 rupees per capita available for
spending, while the British areas had 2.69 rupees.
28 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. I also tried com-
bining these two regressions by adding the interaction of the direct rule
dummy and the cultivator-based land revenue system dummy as an
additional variable. I find that the difference between the direct and
indirectly ruled areas is mainly for areas with a landlord-based land
revenue system. Among places with a cultivator-based land revenue
system, the difference between direct and indirect rule areas is statistically
insignificant.
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difference with the native state rulers is that this class of
landlords had no penalties for poor governance: they could
be deprived of their privileges only if they failed to pay their
revenue commitments to the British state.
The third institutional difference highlighted in section III
related to the incentives of the administrators. The kings in
native state areas had longer tenures than typical British
administrators and were also liable to be deposed for poor
governance. It is difficult to assess the empirical signifi-
cance of these factors directly: the length of tenure of the
ruler is highly correlated with the direct rule dummy (cor-
relation  0.90), and all the kings were subject to the
disciplining mechanism of potential British intervention. I
document some evidence that poor governance in the past is
predictive of future outcomes. I reran the IV regression and
included a dummy variable for whether the ruler of that
native state was ever deposed by the British for misrule. I
find that this variable usually has a negative sign and is
statistically significant for several public goods (table 12,
column 4). The inclusion of this variable increases the size
of the negative coefficients on the British dummy, which
now represent the difference between the directly ruled
areas and the areas with kings who were never deposed. In
fact, there are no significant differences in public goods
between British areas and native state areas where the ruler
had been deposed for poor governance.29
This set of results strongly suggests that indicators of
poor colonial period governance (whether the ruler was ever
deposed in native state areas, whether the area had a
landlord-based land revenue system in the directly ruled
areas) have a persistent long-term impact on postcolonial
outcomes. The overall result of the directly ruled areas
lagging behind suggests that the institutional features of
indirect rule favored better governance, on average, in the
native states compared to the directly ruled areas.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, I use an unusual feature of British annex-
ation policy to compare long-run outcomes of areas in India
that were under direct British colonial rule with areas ruled
by local kings under the indirect political control of the
British. The annexation of areas where the local ruler died
without a natural heir provides an exogenous determinant of
whether an area came under direct British rule and therefore
29 The difference between the coefficient on the British dummy and the
coefficient on the “ruler ever deposed” variable is never statistically
significant.
TABLE 12.—THE ROLE OF TAX REVENUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND RULER QUALITY IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION
Base
Specification
Controlling for Tax Revenue
per Capita
Controlling for Land Tenure
System
Controlling for Whether
Ruler Was Ever Deposed by
British Dummy British Dummy
Tax Revenue
per Capita British Dummy
Cultivator-Based
Land Revenue
System Dummy British Dummy
Ruler Ever
Deposed
IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables: Proportion of villages having public goods (mean of 1981 and 1991 data)
Primary school 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.064 0.090** 0.019 0.045
(0.041) (0.046) (0.011) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
Middle school 0.091** 0.049 0.000 0.063 0.035 0.103** 0.074**
(0.037) (0.034) (0.007) (0.051) (0.036) (0.039) (0.031)
High school 0.065 0.102** 0.005 0.065 0.006 0.070 0.027
(0.042) (0.049) (0.008) (0.054) (0.037) (0.049) (0.048)
Primary health center 0.031** 0.063* 0.001 0.034** 0.005 0.035** 0.020
(0.013) (0.036) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
Primary health
subcenter
0.053** 0.066 0.001 0.050* 0.001 0.061*** 0.039*
(0.021) (0.055) (0.013) (0.027) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Canals 0.043 0.034** 0.001 0.031 0.002 0.048 0.028
(0.028) (0.017) (0.003) (0.022) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019)
Roads 0.198*** 0.230*** 0.013 0.163* 0.113 0.225*** 0.151**
(0.066) (0.086) (0.015) (0.093) (0.089) (0.069) (0.073)
Combined public goods 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.002 0.054* 0.034 0.085*** 0.056**
(0.023) (0.029) (0.006) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 163 163 140 163
Number of native states 71 71 51 71
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
All regressions are for the post-1847 sample consisting of areas that were not annexed in or before 1847. Column 1 shows the base IV specifications from column 5 of table 8. Data are missing for middle schools
in Gujarat, high schools in Madhya Pradesh, and primary health subcenters in Karnataka. Data are missing for Assam in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.
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controls effectively for the selectivity in colonial annexation
policy. The instrumental variable results indicate that di-
rectly ruled areas lag behind the availability of public goods
such as schools, health facilities, and roads in the postcolo-
nial period, with adverse consequences for development
outcomes such as poverty and infant mortality rates.
The study highlights three key features relevant to under-
standing the impacts of history. First, colonial annexation
policy was indeed very selective and tended to focus on
areas with higher agricultural potential. This needs to be
kept in mind for any future research on the impact of
colonial policies and institutions.
Second, indicators of the quality of governance in the
colonial period have persistent effects on long-term out-
comes. In particular, the effect of direct versus indirect rule
depends crucially on the incentives that local administrators
faced. For India, the indirect rule exercised by landlords
within the British Empire leads to worse outcomes, while
the indirect rule exercised by hereditary kings results in
better outcomes. The key difference is that kings were
explicitly subject to being removed in cases of gross mis-
rule, while landlords did not have this institutional con-
straint.
Third, the impact of colonial period governance becomes
more muted over the longer term in the fact of explicit
postcolonial policies designed to equalize access to schools,
health centers, and roads. It is therefore possible to undo the
effects of historical circumstances, though the results in this
paper indicate that this process can take several decades.
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DATA APPENDIX
A. Major Native States, 1947
Native State
Number of Guns
in Salute
Date of Treaty
with British
Area
(sq. miles)
Population
(1896)
Religion
of Ruler
Number of Modern
Districts
Baroda 21 1802 8,570 2,185,005 Hindu 3
Gwalior 21 1781 29,046 3,115,857 Hindu 9
Hyderabad 21 1759 98,000 9,845,594 Muslim 20
Kashmir 21 1846 80,000 1,534,972 Hindu 14
Mysore 21 1799 24,723 4,186,188 Hindu 10
Bhopal 19 1817 6,873 954,901 Muslim 3
Indore 19 1805 8,400 1,054,237 Hindu 3
Kolhapur 19 1766 2,816 800,189 Hindu 1
Travancore 19 1723 6,730 2,401,158 Hindu 6
Udaipur 19 1818 12,670 1,494,220 Hindu 3
Bharatpur 17 1803 1,974 645,540 Hindu 1
Bikaner 17 1818 22,340 509,021 Hindu 3
Bundi 17 1818 2,300 254,701 Hindu 1
Cochin 17 1791 1,361 600,278 Hindu 3
Jaipur 17 1818 14,465 2,534,357 Hindu 3
Jodhpur 17 1818 37,000 1,750,403 Hindu 5
Karauli 17 1817 1,208 148,670 Hindu 1
Kota 17 1817 3,797 517,275 Hindu 1
Kutch 17 1809 6,500 512,084 Hindu 1
Patiala 17 1809 5,887 1,467,433 Sikh 5
Rewa 17 1812 1,000 1,305,124 Hindu 4
Tonk 17 1817 2,509 338,029 Muslim 1
Alwar 15 1803 3,024 682,926 Hindu 1
Banswara 15 1818 1,300 152,045 Hindu 1
Datia 15 1804 836 182,598 Hindu 1
Dewas 15 1818 2,566 142,162 Hindu 1
Dhar 15 1819 1,740 149,244 Hindu 1
Dholpur 15 1779 1,200 249,657 Hindu 1
Dungarpur 15 1818 1,000 153,381 Hindu 1
Idar 15 1812 4,966 258,429 Hindu 1
Jaisalmer 15 1818 16,447 108,143 Hindu 1
Kishangarh 15 1818 724 112,633 Hindu 1
Orchha 15 1812 2,000 311,514 Hindu 1
Partabgarh 15 1818 1,460 79,568 Hindu 1
Rampur 15 1794 899 541,914 Muslim 1
Sirohi 15 1823 3,020 142,903 Hindu 1
Bhavnagar 13 1807 2,860 400,323 Hindu 1
Cooch Behar 13 1773 1,307 602,624 Hindu 1
Dhrangadhra 13 1807 1,142 99,686 Hindu 1
Jaora 13 1818 872 108,343 Muslim 2
Jhalawar 13 1838 2,694 340,488 Hindu 1
Jind 13 1809 1,323 294,862 Sikh 1
Junagadh 13 1807 3,283 387,499 Muslim 2
Kapurthala 13 1846 620 252,617 Sikh 1
Nabha 13 1809 928 261,824 Sikh 1
Nawanagar 13 1807 1,379 316,147 Hindu 1
Palanpur 13 1809 3,150 234,402 Muslim 1
Porbandar 13 1807 636 71,072 Hindu 1
Rajpipla 13 1821 1,514 59,834 Hindu 1
Ratlam 13 1819 729 87,314 Hindu 1
Ajaigarh 11 1807 802 81,454 Hindu 1
Ali Rajpur 11 1818 836 56,287 Hindu 1
Barwani 11 1818 1,362 56,445 Hindu 1
Bijawar 11 1811 973 113,285 Hindu 1
Bilaspur 11 1846 Hindu 1
Cambay 11 1771 350 86,074 Muslim 1
Chamba 11 1846 3,180 115,773 Hindu 1
Charkhari 11 1804 788 143,015 Hindu 1
Chhatarpur 11 1806 1,169 164,376 Hindu 1
Faridkot 11 1809 612 97,034 Hindu 1
Gondal 11 1807 687 135,604 Hindu 1
Jhabua 11 1821 1,336 147,100 Hindu 1
Mandi 11 1846 1,000 147,017 Hindu 1
Morvi 11 1807 821 90,016 Hindu 1
Narsinghgarh 11 1818 623 112,427 Hindu 1
Panna 11 1807 2,568 227,306 Hindu 1
Pudukkottai 11 1803 1,101 302,127 Hindu 1
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Native State
Number of Guns
in Salute
Date of Treaty
with British
Area
(sq. miles)
Population
(1896)
Religion
of Ruler
Number of Modern
Districts
Radhanpur 11 1813 1,150 98,129 Muslim 1
Rajgarh 11 1818 655 117,533 Hindu 1
Sailana 11 1819 114 29,723 Hindu 1
Sirmur 11 1815 1,077 112,371 Hindu 1
Tehri Garhwal 11 1820 4,180 199,836 Hindu 3
Wankaner 11 1807 376 30,491 Hindu 1
Balasinor 9 189 46,328 Muslim 1
Bansda 9 1802 384 34,122 Hindu 1
Chhota Udepur 9 1822 873 71,218 Hindu 1
Dharampur 9 794 101,289 Hindu 1
Dhrol 9 400 21,177 Hindu 1
Kalahandi 9 1829 1
Khilchipur 9 1818 273 36,125 Hindu 1
Limbdi 9 344 40,186 Hindu 1
Maihar 9 400 71,709 Hindu 1
Mayurbhanj 9 1829 4,243 385,737 Hindu 2
Nagod 9 1809 450 79,629 Hindu 1
Rajkot 9 1807 283 46,540 Hindu 1
Sangli 9 896 196,832 Hindu 1
Savantwadi 9 1730 900 174,433 Hindu 1
Bashahr 9 1815 3,320 64,345 Hindu 1
Dhenkanal 1829 1,463 208,316 1
Keunjhar 1829 3,096 215,612 Hindu 1
Raigarh 1,486 128,943 1
Sarguja 1817 6,055 270,311 Hindu 1
Note: Native states listed in decreasing order of the number of guns in ceremonial salute. Number of modern districts refers to the number of districts containing areas from the native state. Several modern districts
contain areas from more than one native state. Native state boundaries may or may not coincide with modern district boundaries.
B. Data Sources
Postindependence data
● Data on district geography, crop areas, yields, irrigation, fertilizer use, adoption of high-yielding varieties: India Agriculture and Climate Data Set
(World Bank), http://www-esd.worldbank.org/indian/home.cfm
● Public goods at village level, 1961, 1981, 1991: Census reports
● District-level data on population, literacy, occupation classes, proportion of scheduled castes, and so on: Indian Database Project by Vanneman
and Barnes (2000)
● Indian District Data, 1961–1991: Machine-readable data file and codebook, Center on Population, Gender, and Social Inequality, College Park,
Maryland. URL: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/vanneman/districts/index.html
Matching postindependence districts with British districts and native states
● Districts and maps of British India: Baden-Powell (1892)
● Districts and maps of modern India: http://www.mapsofindia.com
● District gazetteers (various issues)
Historical data
● Area and revenue of native states: Chakrabarti (1896) and Hunter et al. (1908)
● Details of death of kings in native states: District gazetteers; Lee-Warner (1904); Menon (1967); http://www.dreamwater.net/regiment/RoyalArk/India/
India.htm; http://www.uq.net.au/
zzhsoszy/ips
● Literacy and infant mortality in earlier periods: District gazetteers
● District-level poverty and inequality: Topalova (2005)
C. Details of Native States Where Rulers Died without Natural Heir, 1848–1856
Native
State
Year of Death
of Ruler Details
Major kingdoms annexed by Lord Dalhousie
Satara 1848 State created in 1818 for defeated Maratha ruler; ruler deposed in favor of his brother in 1842; state annexed by lapse in
1848.
Sambalpur 1849 Part of Bhonsla kingdom originally; handed over to a local ruler, Maharaja Sahi, in 1818 and to his queen on his death in
1827. Kingdom given to relative Narayan Singh in 1833 after local insurrection. Annexed by Doctrine of Lapse in
1849 when ruler died without heir.
Jhansi 1853 First treaty of protection with British in 1804; ruler died without heir in 1835 and in 1838 but successors installed by
British and state not annexed; state annexed by Lord Dalhousie due to lapse in 1853.
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Native
State
Year of Death
of Ruler Details
Nagpur 1854 Bhonsla ruler defeated in 1818, and kingdom put under British administration until 1830; Taken over by Doctrine of
Lapse in 1854 after death of ruler in December 1853.
Major kingdoms where rulers died without heir in 1848–1856 but which were not annexed
Orchha 1852 Lord Dalhousie did not annex on grounds of Orchha being a nontributary state; also the British had a prior agreement
with the queen (made in 1841), which allowed her to adopt an heir.
Karauli 1853 Ruler died without heir in 1853; Lord Dalhousie recommended annexation but was disallowed by the East India
Company’s Court of Directors.
Chhatarpur 1854 Ruler died without heir in 1854 and was succeeded by his nephew.
Ajaigarh 1855 Ruler died without heir in 1855, and the state was annexed by Lord Dalhousie. Royal family remained loyal to the British
during the 1857 revolt, and the state was returned to an adopted heir by Lord Canning in 1857.
D. Table Appendix
TABLE A.1.—IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE ON STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Fraction of Workforce
in Manufacturing
Fraction of Rural
Workforce in
Manufacturing
Fraction of Workforce
in Farming
Fraction of Rural
Workforce in Farming
1961–1991 1961–1991 1991 Only 1991 Only 1961–1991 1961–1991 1991 Only 1991 Only
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
British dummy 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.052 0.007 0.054*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.020) (0.032) (0.019) (0.032)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 1,245 620 313 155 1,245 620 313 155
Number of native states 94 70 94 70 94 70 94 70
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
Instrument is a dummy for whether the ruler died without an heir in the period 1848–1856. Data are for the census years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991.
TABLE A.2.—DOES THE RELIGION OF THE RULER MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Coefficient
British Dummy Muslim Ruler Sikh Ruler
Dependent variables: Proportion of villages having public goods (mean of 1981 and 1991 data)
Primary school 0.028 0.085* 0.295***
(0.039) (0.048) (0.047)
Middle school 0.095* 0.028 0.195***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.039)
High school 0.072 0.036 0.149***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.034)
Primary health center 0.036* 0.014 0.046***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.011)
Primary health subcenter 0.063** 0.022 0.054
(0.027) (0.019) (0.054)
Canals 0.053 0.031* 0.025
(0.033) (0.018) (0.048)
Roads 0.186*** 0.021 0.634***
(0.069) (0.048) (0.092)
Combined public goods 0.074*** 0.013 0.200***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.042)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes
Number of observations 374
Number of native states 93
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Data are missing for middle schools in Gujarat, high schools in Madhya Pradesh, and primary health subcenters in Karnataka. Data are missing for Assam in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.
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TABLE A.3.—IS THERE CONVERGENCE IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION?
OLS IV
Coefficient Coefficient
British Dummy 1961 Level British Dummy 1961 Level
Primary school 0.016 0.239** 0.074** 0.491***
(0.024) (0.095) (0.032) (0.058)
Middle school 0.010 0.734*** 0.063* 0.941***
(0.028) (0.094) (0.034) (0.174)
High school 0.014 1.528*** 0.011 1.464***
(0.011) (0.125) (0.017) (0.113)
Primary health center 0.024** 0.872*** 0.045* 1.470***
(0.011) (0.301) (0.024) (0.157)
Canals 0.021 0.139 0.015 6.645*
(0.015) (0.242) (0.049) (3.718)
Roads 0.062 0.355*** 0.061* 0.242***
(0.039) (0.081) (0.036) (0.077)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes
Number of districts 225 124
Number of native states 78 60
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Data on rural health centers and canals are missing for UP, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Orissa, and Maharashtra. Data on primary schools, middle schools, and dispensaries are missing for Uttar Pradesh. Data on
middle schools, canals, and roads are missing for West Bengal. Data on roads are missing for Punjab and Rajasthan.
TABLE A.4.—POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND COMPETITION
Voter Turnout in State Voter Turnout in State Winning Margin (%) Winning Margin (%)
1960s 1960s Post-1980 Post-1980 1960s 1960s Post-1980 Post-1980
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
British dummy 0.015 0.050 0.015 0.013 0.003 0.072 0.003 0.006
(0.031) (0.063) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.077) (0.006) (0.012)
Mean of dependent variable 0.56 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 164 102 314 135 164 102 314 135
Number of native states
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
Voter turnout is measured as the fraction of voters who actually voted in the election. Winning margin is computed as the difference between the vote share of the winning candidate and the runner-up candidate.
Post-1980 data include elections between 1980 and 2004. 1960s data are for the first election in the state after 1959. This regression is based on data from the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Punjab.
TABLE A.5.—IMPACT OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS
Coefficient on Dummy for Cultivator-Based Land Tenure System
British Empire OLS Native States OLS
(1) (2)
Dependent variables: Proportion of villages having public goods (mean of 1981 and 1991 data)
Primary school 0.049 0.058
(0.044) (0.054)
Middle school 0.106*** 0.011
(0.035) (0.049)
High school 0.070** 0.035
(0.028) (0.040)
Primary health center 0.028*** 0.012
(0.009) (0.012)
Primary health subcenter 0.032 0.008
(0.023) (0.018)
Canals 0.004 0.009
(0.014) (0.026)
Roads 0.263*** 0.129
(0.059) (0.101)
Combined public goods 0.080*** 0.023
(0.026) (0.034)
Controls
Latitude, rainfall, coast Yes Yes
Proportion sandy/barren Yes Yes
Number of districts 234 105
Number of native states 31 43
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering within native states.
***Significant at 1%.
Data are missing for middle schools in Gujarat, high schools in Madhya Pradesh, and primary health subcenters in Karnataka. Data are missing for Assam in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.
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